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Abstract
This paper investigates the relationship between capital structure and firm perfor-
mance, paying particular attention to the degree of industry competition. The pa-
per applies a novel measure of competition, the Boone indicator, to the leverage-
performance relationship. Using panel data consisting of 257 South African firms
over the period 1998 to 2009, this paper examines the effect of capital structure on
firm performance and investigates the extent to which the relationship depends on
the level of product market competition. The results suggest that financial leverage
has a positive and significant effect on firm performance. It is also found that prod-
uct market competition enhances the performance effect of leverage. The results are
robust to alternative measures of competition and leverage.
JEL classification: G32; L11; L25
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1. Introduction
Despite several decades of research, there is no generally accepted conclusion
about the relationship between capital structure and firm performance. Following
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the seminal papers of Modigliani & Miller (1958, 1963) suggesting that, but for the
tax-advantage of debt, capital structure is irrelevant to firm performance, the rela-
tionship between financial leverage and firm performance has attracted much debate
and mixed empirical findings. The trade-off between agency costs of debt and equity
(Jensen & Meckling, 1976); the limited liability effect of debt (Brander & Lewis,
1986); and the disciplining effect of debt (Grossman & Hart, 1983; Jensen, 1986)
all suggest a positive effect of leverage on performance. However, possible underin-
vestment problems associated with debt (Myers, 1977) and stakeholder reactions to
leverage (Maksimovic & Titman, 1991; Titman, 1984) suggest negative effects. Ex-
tensions of these theories (Bolton & Scharfstein, 1990; Chevalier & Scharfstein, 1996;
Dasgupta & Titman, 1998) suggest that leverage opens up opportunities for rivalry
predation in concentrated product markets, thus conditioning the performance effect
of leverage on the degree of competition in the product market. The existing evi-
dence of these interaction effects of leverage and competition is based on U.S. firms
(Campello, 2003, 2006; Chevalier, 1995a,b; Kovenock & Phillips, 1997; Opler & Tit-
man, 1994). The South African experience offers an opportunity to gain new insight.
Distinct from the U.S., South Africa features a highly concentrated and pyramidal
ownership structure of firms (Barr et al., 1995; Kantor, 1998), overly concentrated
product markets (Fedderke et al., 2007), and a less robust regulatory and legal envi-
ronment (Roberts, 2004, 2008). These attributes suggest distinctively severe agency
costs of equity and product market predation.
Using panel data consisting of 257 South African firms over the period 1998 to
2009, this study seeks to address three questions: (1) Does knowledge about product
market competition improve our understanding of leverage-performance relationship
in developing countries? (2) To what extent does this relationship hold or vary across
alternative measures of competition? (3) To what extent do the effects of leverage
on performance and its interaction with competition depend on rival firms’ leverage
levels?
The findings of this paper show a significant positive effect of leverage on firm
performance. This effect is non-linear but remains significantly positive over the
relevant range of leverage. It is also found that the interaction effect of leverage
and competition on firm performance is positive. The findings imply that competi-
tion enhances the benefits of leverage. Using relative-to-rival firms’ leverage yields
consistent results.
These findings are broadly consistent with Opler & Titman (1994) and Kovenock
& Phillips (1997) in respect of the adverse interaction effect of leverage and product
market concentration (uncompetitiveness). However, these authors find statistically
insignificant direct negative effects of leverage on firm performance, contrary to the
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direct positive effects reported in this paper. The observed difference in the direct
effect of leverage could be attributed to the nature and severity of agency costs of
equity faced by South African firms.
This paper contributes to the existing literature in the following ways: first, by
focusing on South African firms, the paper provides firsthand developing country
evidence of the interaction effect of leverage and competition on performance. Given
the unique characteristics of South African product markets, this paper provides
evidence from a potentially highly predatory environment with severe agency costs
of equity. To the author’s knowledge, this issue has not been previously addressed.
Second, in addition to the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index, this study adopts a new mea-
sure of competition, the Boone indicator (Boone et al., 2005, 2007; Boone, 2008),
which estimates the extent to which firms suffer lost earnings (or market share) as
a result of being inefficient. The Boone indicator helps address potential setbacks in
concentration indexes used in all previous studies (Opler & Titman, 1994; Chevalier,
1995a,b; Kovenock & Phillips, 1997; Campello, 2003, 2006). For instance, a high
level of product market concentration could simply be the outcome of pronounced
efficiency (Demsetz, 1973) or the exit of inefficient firms from the market as compe-
tition intensifies, in which case the profits of the more efficient firms increase (Boone
et al., 2005, 2007; Boone, 2008).
The remainder of this paper is organised as follows. Section 2 provides brief
motivation for the study of South African firms. Section 3 presents a review of
the relevant theoretical literature and empirical evidence; whilst Section 4 outlines
the research hypothesis. Section 5 describes the data and variables used for the
study. Section 6 discusses the empirical estimation methods. Section 7 presents the
empirical results. The summary and conclusion of the study are presented in Section
8.
2. South African corporate context
Concentrated and pyramidal ownership structures, as well as overly concentrated
product markets, are some of the key features that distinguish South African firms
from their U.S. counterparts. A considerably large proportion of Johannesburg Stock
Exchange (JSE) listings are effectively controlled by groups with a pyramidal owner-
ship structure.1 Hence, South African firms are distinct from U.S. firms by way of the
1For instance, almost 80% of JSE listings was controlled by groups in 1995 and this group
structure has seen little change over time (Barr et al., 1995; Kantor, 1998). In fact, as at the end
of 2002, 56.2% of the market capitalisation of JSE listings was controlled by four companies (see
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agency problems they face. Conflict of interest is largely between minority and ma-
jority shareholders, rather than between managers and shareholder or creditors and
shareholders as in the U.S. and U.K. (Barr et al., 1995; Kantor, 1998). In this agency
relationship, the minority shareholders are the agents; the majority shareholders, the
principals. As noted in Morck et al. (1998), such a system of ownership leads to an
extreme level of expropriation of the minority shareholders since significant control
rights can be exercised with little equity stake. This ownership structure, largely sus-
tained by the tax advantage of equity investment, holding companies, cross-holding
and voting trusts, has seen little change over time.2 The agency problems associ-
ated with such a system of ownership may possibly be mitigated by the disciplinary
measures embodied in debt contracts. Although debt financing comes with its own
potential agency problems, with such a system of ownership the disciplinary measures
embodied in debt contracts should logically be more desirable.
Although high levels of concentrated ownership, which have emerged from the
pyramidal ownership structure (Ntim et al., 2012), may be associated with lower
agency costs (Fama & Jensen, 1983; Villalonga & Amit, 2006), the robustness of
the regulatory environment plays a major role (Anderson & Reeb, 2003). Compared
to the U.S., regulatory quality is less robust in South Africa (Roberts, 2004, 2008),
suggesting that the agency benefits of a concentrated ownership, relative to the asso-
ciated agency costs, may be less. It is reasonable to suggest that the legal structures
in South Africa may offer relatively less protection to investors, thus making the
agency problems worse.
Another distinctive feature of South African firms is the degree of concentration
in their product markets. Traditionally, South African firms are faced with a very
high degree of concentration in market shares, which does not encourage competition.
Using both firm level and aggregate industry data, Aghion et al. (2008) find that
competition is relatively low in South Africa.3 Consistent evidence is provided by
Fedderke et al. (2007), who document mark-ups twice as high among South African
manufacturing firms as among U.S. manufacturing firms. These findings, coupled
with relatively suboptimal regulation, suggest a higher likelihood of rivalry predation
in South Africa than in the U.S.
Over the past few years, stringent efforts have been made to improve product
market competition. In 1999, South Africa’s Competition Board was replaced with
Rossouw et al., 2002).
2For full a review of this control process, see Kantor (1998).
3Their proxy for competition is price cost margin measured alternatively as the ratio of price to
production cost; the ratio of value added to sales; and the ratio of operating income to sales.
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a new Competition Commission following the implementation of the Competition Act
of 1998. These steps are meant to effectively address anticompetitive practices and
to promote regulatory independence (Roberts, 2008). Unsurprisingly, Fedderke &
Simbanegavi (2008) note that South African manufacturing industries are becoming
less concentrated.
The uniqueness of the agency problems faced by South African firms makes it
worthwhile to conduct further studies regarding the relationship between leverage,
competition and performance. Since the existing evidence is in respect of U.S. firms,
the findings may provide a strong indication of the extent to which the disciplinary
effect of leverage can mitigate the agency costs of equity in a potentially highly
predatory environment.
3. Literature review
3.1. Leverage and firm performance
Following the seminal paper of Modigliani & Miller (1958), the study of cap-
ital structure has attracted much attention with differing theoretical predictions.
Modigliani & Miller (1958) predict that, in a perfect capital market, capital structure
of a firm is irrelevant to its value (hence, performance). Capital structure, however,
matters for firms for several reasons, which arise mainly from the tax-deductibility
of debt interest and agency theory.
Jensen & Meckling (1976) identify two main types of agency costs. The first,
agency costs of outside equity, arises from the conflict of interest between the shareholder-
manager and outside equity participant. As the shareholder-manager shares profits
with the outside equity participant, the former has an incentive to maximise his
utility by engaging in moral hazard. Such behaviour calls for increased monitoring
and incentive mechanisms or contractual relations. These translate into higher costs
which increase with higher outside equity participation. Hence, higher leverage has
the potential to reduce costs and enhance performance. Extending this proposi-
tion, the benefits of leverage have been attributed to the discipline that comes with
leverage through interest payment pre-commitments (Jensen, 1986), the threat of
bankruptcy (Grossman & Hart, 1983), and the informational content of debt (Harris
& Raviv, 1990).
The second type of agency costs identified by Jensen & Meckling (1976) arises
from a conflict of interest between shareholders and debt holders. Shareholders find
it rewarding to engage in excessive risk-taking since profits accrue to them but losses
are shared proportionally with creditors. As such behaviour will be anticipated by
5
debtholders, the cost of borrowing to the firm may be higher.4 This suggests that
leverage can also have an adverse effect on firm performance, especially if the firm
is already highly leveraged. Myers (1977) extends this analysis to the case where
leverage may rather lead to suboptimal investment. As debt transfers part of the
benefits of investment options to the debtholders, under certain conditions, valuable
investment opportunities may be rejected by the levered firm, leading to subopti-
mal investment and reduced market value of the firm.5 In another development
Stulz (1990) shows that whilst debt financing may be a credible device in mitigating
overinvestment problems, it can worsen the underinvestment problems, as regular
outflows of cash to debtholders place further resource constraints on managers.
The literature extends the agency costs of debt to the conflict of interest between
the firm and its stakeholders. Titman (1984) argues that leverage affects the likeli-
hood of a firm’s liquidation, which can be costly to both its customers and creditors
depending on the firm’s liquidation policy. Customers may then be willing to trade
with a highly leveraged firm only if its prices are low. Also, debt holders will be
more inclined to impose restrictive covenants. Maksimovic & Titman (1991) argue
that customers, under certain circumstances, may perceive the product quality of a
highly leveraged firm to be compromised, making them reluctant to transact with
it. Thus, they also suggest that a high level of leverage can be detrimental to firm
performance.
Based on these theories, mixed empirical conclusions have been documented. Sev-
eral studies report negative effects of leverage on firm performance (King & Santor,
2008; Ghosh, 2008; Bhagat & Bolton, 2008), whilst others report positive effects
(Berger & Bonaccorsi di Patti, 2006; Margaritis & Psillaki, 2010; Weill, 2008) or
insignificant effects (Phillips & Sipahioglu, 2004). A few studies suggest that the
leverage-performance relationship is conditional on the degree of agency problems
associated with firms (Ruland & Zhou, 2005; Schoubben & Van Hulle, 2006). For
instance, Schoubben & Van Hulle (2006) show that leverage has a positive effect on
quoted firms but a negative effect on non-quoted firms. Similarly, Ruland & Zhou
(2005) find that leverage enhances the performance of diversified firms, especially
small-sized diversified firms that are associated with higher agency costs. Evidence
in Ghosh (2008) also conditions the effects of leverage on foreign market participa-
tion, noting that, for a sample of Indian firms, the (negative) impact of leverage is
higher for firms with foreign debt, and that a leveraged firm’s performance is more
4Higher borrowing costs reflect monitoring and bonding expenses.
5For example, when the firm is highly leveraged such that the net present value of the investment
opportunity is less than debt payment to creditors.
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sensitive to changes in nominal exchange rate.
Recent extensions of the literature (Bolton & Scharfstein, 1990; Chevalier, 1995a,b;
Chevalier & Scharfstein, 1996; Dasgupta & Titman, 1998) attach strong significance
to product market competition in the leverage-performance relationship, since it
gives an indication of the likelihood and the nature of rival firms’ reaction following
a firm’s leverage increase.
3.2. Leverage, pricing strategy, competition and firm performance
Leverage has a complex interaction with product market competition. Brander &
Lewis (1986) suggest that leverage permits firms to compete more aggressively in a
product market due to limited liability. The strategic effect of such behaviour could
offset the associated costly agency problems. Wanzenried (2003), however, conditions
the effects on profit of such strategic behaviour on the nature of competition and
product characteristics. This suggests that the limited liability effect of debt could
fail to boost the profitability of the leveraged firm. Specifically, the limited liability
effect of debt can lead to a decrease in profit if competition is Cournot. The reason
is that limited liability induces a more aggressive production which leads to lower re-
alised prices. The decrease in profit is higher the more substitutable the products are.
Also, predation theories and related literature (Fudenberg & Tirole, 1986; Bolton &
Scharfstein, 1990; Chevalier & Scharfstein, 1996; Dasgupta & Titman, 1998) suggest
that leveraged firms could suffer a significant competitive disadvantage in product
markets.
Leveraged firms may be more vulnerable to predation in concentrated product
markets. Fudenberg & Tirole (1986) suggest that, given that current period profit
is a signal for future prospects in a product market, incumbent firms may have
an incentive to predate on entrant firms. Such action lowers the current period
profits of the entrant firms and sends incorrect signals about future prospects. As
leveraged firms may be more financially constrained than their less leveraged rivals
in concentrated product markets, their sensitivity to product market signals is likely
to be relatively higher.
A similar argument, which does not make “signal-jamming” a necessary condition
for predation, is presented by Bolton & Scharfstein (1990). They show that debt
contracts designed to align the interest of managers to creditors often create an
opportunity for rivalry predation. An optimal contract requires periodic payment by
the leveraged firms to the creditors; failing this, the firm is liquidated. This contract,
however, encourages rivalry predation since this can lower the leveraged firm’s current
period profit, making it more likely to be liquidated and exit the market. This rivalry
predation continues for as long as it accrues positive net benefits for the rival firm.
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In a perfect (or more) competitive industry, each firm accounts for a relatively small
proportion of the market. Hence, there should be less incentive to predate in more
competitive markets.
Chevalier & Scharfstein (1996) extend the above-mentioned model along the lines
of switching cost models. They note that leverage constrains a firm’s ability to invest
in market shares since the fear of default restricts attention to current period perfor-
mance. Consistently, they show that highly leveraged firms charge higher prices than
their less leveraged counterparts during recession. This suggests that high leveraged
firms are expected to have a competitive disadvantage in concentrated or uncom-
petitive industries, given that firms behave less competitively during recession. The
magnitude of this disadvantage should decrease with the degree of competitiveness
in the product market.
Chevalier (1995a) provides evidence in respect of the competitive disadvantage
associated with leverage. In her study of the U.S. supermarket industry, she finds that
an increase in leverage leads to increased market value of competitors. Also, when
incumbents are highly leveraged, entry and expansion of new firms are likely. The
results suggest that leverage softens product market competition. Again, Chevalier
(1995b) shows that market prices rise following an increase in leverage if rival firms
are also highly leveraged. The highly leveraged firms are found to charge higher
prices than their less leveraged competitors. The reverse is true when rivals are less
leveraged and markets are concentrated: prices drop as highly leveraged firms leave
the market. The findings suggest that highly leveraged firms are more vulnerable to
predation in product markets with less competition and less leveraged rivals.
Perhaps the most direct evidence of the interaction effects of capital structure
and competition is provided by Opler & Titman (1994). They find that highly lever-
aged firms lose market share to their less leveraged counterparts during industry
downturns. Particularly, they find that the lost market share is severe for firms in
concentrated markets. In another development, Kovenock & Phillips (1997) find that
leverage has an adverse effect on a firm’s investment and is positively associated with
plant closure. Interestingly, they find that the significance of these effects depends
highly on the capital structure and concentration interaction terms, suggesting se-
vere agency problems in concentrated markets. The fact that the evidence presented
in these studies is more pronounced in concentrated product markets suggests that
highly leveraged firms are more vulnerable to predatory pricing in concentrated (un-
competitive) product markets.
Recent evidence is provided by Campello (2003, 2006). Campello (2003) inves-
tigates the impact of leverage on the relative growth of firms’ sales in the product
market. He finds that leverage has a negative impact on relative-to-industry sales
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growth of firms in relatively less leveraged industries during recession, but not during
boom. This finding can be attributed to less competitive behaviour associated with
macroeconomic downturns. The finding further indicates that the effects of leverage
significantly depend on the severity of agency problems in the product market. This
view agrees, at least in part, with his 2006 study which finds that moderate levels
of debt are associated with high sales performance, whilst high levels are associated
with poor performance. Particularly, he finds significantly higher effects for firms in
concentrated markets compared to their counterparts in competitive markets.
It must be emphasized that, besides the predation-mitigating benefits of compe-
tition, the discipline that comes with competition (Aghion et al., 1997; Hart, 1983)
reinforces the disciplining effects of leverage or mitigates the agency problems of debt.
For instance, Nickell (1996) shows a positive relationship between several measures
of competition and firm performance measured as total factor productivity (TFP)
growth. In contrast, Aghion et al. (1997) note that fierce competition could cause
firms to reduce their leverage, resulting in the reduced disciplining effect of leverage.
This effect could be higher than the direct disciplining effect of competition, implying
a net reduction in product market discipline. Recent work by Beiner et al. (2011) in
respect of 200 Swiss firms suggests a negative relationship between product market
competition (measured as HHI) and firm performance.
The review of the theoretical and empirical evidence presented in this section
thus far points to appealing interactions between capital structure, competition and
firm performance. It is worth emphasising that the empirical evidence taking this
interaction into account is all based on U.S. data and employ concentration-based
measures of competition. In what follows, the measure of and issues relating to
competition are discussed.
3.3. Leverage and product market competition: Measurement issues
Whilst a few studies provide some evidence on the interaction between lever-
age, competition and performance, the proxies for competition may be problematic.
Measuring competition normally takes a structural or non-structural approach. The
structural approach infers competition from the degree of product market concentra-
tion, notably the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) as in Campello (2006) and four-
firm concentration ratio as in Opler & Titman (1994), Chevalier (1995a,b), Kovenock
& Phillips (1997) and Campello (2003). Higher product market concentration is as-
sociated with lower competition and vice versa. The non-structural approach, on
the other hand, derives the degree of competition from market behaviour. The pref-
erence for a non-structural measure of competition stems from the fact that higher
concentration may not necessarily imply lower competition. In fact, the efficiency-
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structure hypothesis notes that a high level of product market concentration could
simply be the outcome of pronounced efficiency (Demsetz, 1973). In this regard,
differential efficiency may cause some firms to grow relatively fast whilst for other
firms efficiency may require downsizing. Likewise, Boone et al. (2005, 2007) argue
that a high level of concentration can arise from strong competition forcing inefficient
firms out of the market. In this sense, concentration may fail to accurately predict
the degree of competition.6
In view of these setbacks, Boone et al. (2005, 2007) and Boone (2008) propose
a new measure of competition, the Boone indicator (BI). The BI measures the sen-
sitivity of firms’ profits (or market shares) to their inefficiency in product markets.
It is based on the assumption that in a more competitive product market firms are
penalised severely in lost profits or market shares for being inefficient. It assumes
that profits increase with efficiency and this increase is higher in more competitive
industries. Thus, unlike concentration-based measures of competition, the BI does
not suffer from reallocation effects within product markets.7 In addition to its ap-
pealing theoretical properties, the BI is simple in data requirements. Following its
pioneering application by van Leuvensteijn et al. (2007) to the European banking
industry, the BI has gained increased popularity in the banking literature. A simi-
lar measure of competition based on the sensitivity of a firm’s profit to rival firms’
strategic decisions is proposed by Kedia (2006). However, improper identification of
strategic decisions, or the use of proxies such as sales makes this measure of compe-
tition most useful for identifying the nature rather than the intensity of competition.
Hence, the BI is the most suitable measure of competition in this study.
In summary, evidence on the interaction of leverage and competition on firm
performance is generally limited and particularly lacking for developing countries in
general and Africa in particular. This work is hoped to fill in the gap. It is also
6For instance, consider the case of a monopoly. Here monopoly price is charged in the market
and concentration is highest. Compare this to a duopoly, where firms with asymmetric cost compete
under Bertrand. The efficient firm has a lower cost (c1) compared to the cost (c2) borne by the less
efficient firm (i.e. c1 > c2). The efficient firm can drive the less efficient firm out of the market by
charging a price slightly less than the latter’s (i.e. p1 = c2 − e < monopoly price). Assuming this
stance leads to the exit of the less efficient firm, concentration is now as high as is the case for the
monopoly. However, the market price is lower than the monopoly price; the incumbent firm keeps
the price below the monopoly price to keep potential entrants out of the market. Concentration-
based measures fail to capture this selection effect of competition: they indicate the same degree
of competition under the two scenarios.
7That is the reallocation of output from less efficient to more efficient firms. For a detailed
review, see Boone et al. (2005, 2007) and Boone (2008)
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clear that evidence provided in respect of the leverage-competition relationship uses
mainly concentration-based measures of competition. For the first time, this study
employs a direct measure of competition in the leverage-performance relationship.
4. Research hypotheses
Based on theoretical predictions and past empirical evidence, as well as the South
African corporate context, three main testable hypotheses are formulated.
The balance between agency costs of equity and debt, emphasised by Jensen &
Meckling (1976) tilts in favour of the latter, given the equity culture and the agency
problems associated with South African firms, as well as the regulatory environment
within which these firms operate. Furthermore, any increased monitoring necessi-
tated by debt-financing (Jensen & Meckling, 1976), though costly, might be expected
to reinforce the discipline that comes with leverage (Grossman & Hart, 1983; Harris
& Raviv, 1990; Jensen, 1986). Moreover, the relatively suboptimal regulatory en-
vironment in South Africa is expected to reinforce the strategic advantage (limited
liability effect) of leverage suggested by Brander & Lewis (1986). Thus, leverage
is expected to yield a positive effect on firm performance. This effect is, however,
expected to decrease at very high levels of leverage given the likely debt overhang
problems emphasised in Myers (1977). This expectation leads to the first hypothesis:
H1: Leverage has a nonlinear positive effect on firm performance.
Leverage makes firms vulnerable to rivalry predation in concentrated or un-
competitive product markets, as shown in the extant literature (Bolton & Scharf-
stein, 1990; Campello, 2003, 2006; Chevalier, 1995a,b; Chevalier & Scharfstein, 1996;
Kovenock & Phillips, 1997; Opler & Titman, 1994). Given that the competitive-
disadvantage of leverage may be only partially offset by the strategic benefits of
leverage emphasised in Brander & Lewis (1986), it is expected that the benefits of
leverage are improved (reduced) by product market competition (concentration). A
second hypothesis is formulated as follows:
H2: The agency benefits of leverage increase (decrease) with product market compe-
tition (concentration).
Finally, to the extent that predatory incentives may be driven by rival firms’ levels
of leverage (Campello, 2003, 2006; Chevalier, 1995b; Chevalier & Scharfstein, 1996),
a related composite hypothesis that the effects of leverage may be competitor-driven
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is formulated:
H3: High relative-to-rival leverage is associated with high firm performance which
increases (decreases) with product market competition (concentration).
5. Data
The study uses an unbalanced panel data consisting of 257 South African firms
listed on the Johannesburg Stock Exchange (JSE) Limited from the period 1998 to
2009, available from DataStream. The sample selection was guided by data avail-
ability. Every non-financial firm with three or more years of consecutive observation
was included.
The sample firms were classified into 8 distinct industries using the Industry
Classification Benchmark (ICB), equivalent to the Datastream Global Equity Indices
level 2. Firms from the financial and utility industries were excluded. These sectors
consisted of firms in banking, insurance, equity investment and real estate, including
investment trusts. These exclusions were motivated by regulatory differences and for
the ease of comparability of results.
5.1. Firm-specific variables
The choice of variables and proxies is guided by the literature. The measure
of performance is return on assets (ROA), measured as total operating profit plus
depreciation and amortization (EBITDA) divided by total assets. By construction,
ROA is a good approximation of the extent to which managers put firms’ resources to
efficient use. ROA, being an accounting measure of performance, has been criticised
because it suffers from the effects of differing accounting standards. However, market
measures of performance, including Tobin’s Q, are not faultless. Demsetz & Lehn
(1985) suggest that ROA better reflects current business conditions whilst Tobin’s
Q mirrors expected future development. In similar fashion, Demsetz & Villalonga
(2001) argue that Tobin’s Q suffers from the use of tangible assets whose depreciation
falls short of their true economic depreciation. Also, they emphasise that, unlike
accounting measure of performance, Tobin’s Q is not independent of psychological
influences. These notwithstanding, evidence points to a high degree of correlation
between ROA and Tobin’s Q, suggesting that either is an appropriate measure of
performance (Scherer & Ross, 1990). As the study employs data from different
industries and firms of varying size, the use of ROA mitigates any size bias in the
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results.8
Leverage (Lev) is measured as total debt divided by total assets. Relative leverage
(Rlev) is measured as the difference between each firm’s leverage and the mean
industry leverage. This is employed to control for the extent to which rival firms are
less (or more) leveraged.
The research controls for other relevant firm-specific variables such as sales growth,
firm size and mean earnings. Sales growth (Growth), a proxy for growth opportu-
nities (King & Santor, 2008; Maury, 2006), is measured as the difference between
sales of firm i at time t and its one-period lagged sales divided by the latter - that is,
(Salesi,t − Salesi,t−1) /Salesi,t−1, where the subscripts i and t indexes firm i at time
t.
Firm size (Size) is measured as the natural logarithm of total assets. While large
firms may be associated with a high degree of moral hazard and increased need for
monitoring, they may also have the benefits of diversification and economies of scale
in monitoring top management (Himmelberg et al., 1999).
Following Ghosh (2008), mean earnings (MROA) is measured as 2-year moving
average of profitability (ROA).9
Two additional variables are also employed in this paper to serve as external
instruments for leverage in order to mitigate possible bias resulting from reverse
causality between leverage and profitability. These are tangible assets and non-debt
tax shield. Tangibility of assets (Tan) is measured as the ratio of tangible assets
to total assets. It plays a major role in firms’ access to debt finance (Booth et al.,
2001; Campello, 2006). This is especially so in developing countries where creditor
protection and contract enforcement is suboptimal. Non-debt tax shield (NDTAX)
is depreciation and amortization divided by total assets.
5.2. Competition variables
The variables used to capture competition are alternatively Herfindahl-Hirschman
Index (HHI) and the Boone indicator (BI). Following Beiner et al. (2011), HHI is
measured as the sum of squared market shares of each firm in a given industry.10
8see Lev & Sunders (1979) for detailed review.
9Ghosh (2008) controls for lagged values of these variables.
10Beiner et al. (2011) follow the standard measurement approach used by the Census of Manu-
facturers to calculate sales-based HHI as the sum of the squared market shares for the top 50 firms
(or all firms if less than 50). Ideally, the calculation of the HHI should incorporate all the firms
in the various industries. In this paper, data unavailability restricts the number of firms in each
industry to the corresponding numbers in the sample. Hence, the actual values could be different
from the ‘strict’ HHI. This notwithstanding, the estimated HHI should still be able to capture the
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That is:
HHIjt = ΣNji=1
(
Salesijt/ΣNji=1Salesijt
)2
, (1)
where HHIjt is the HHI for industry j at time t; Salesijt represents sales of firm i
in industry j at time t. Higher values of the HHI indicate more concentration and
less competitive markets.
The Boone indicator is a new measure of competition based on the theoretical
assumption that, in a more efficient or competitive industry, firms are punished
severely for being inefficient (Boone et al., 2005, 2007; Boone, 2008). Hence, for an
industry with a high level of competition, it is expected that an increase in marginal
cost leads to a drastic fall in variable profits. Therefore, the Boone indicator is
measured by estimating the following regression:
V ROAit = α + βtlnMcij + i,t, (2)
where V ROAit is the variable profit (measured as sales revenue less cost of goods
sold of firm i in industry j divided by its total assets; lnMcij is the natural logarithm
of the marginal cost (approximated by cost of goods sold divided by sales revenue)
of firm i in industry j; and βt is the time-varying parameter, the absolute value of
which measures competition. The sign of the coefficients is expected to be negative.
The higher the absolute value of the coefficients, the higher is the level of competition
in the industry. Hence, BI is the absolute value of βt.11
Table 1 provides the mean values of each variable by industry. There is a con-
siderable degree of variability in return on assets, leverage and competition across
industries. The basic materials industry has the least (mean) return on assets. This
industry is less concentrated and relatively highly leveraged. At the other extreme is
the telecommunications industry with the highest return on assets, which is highly
concentrated and generally debt-funded.
[Table 1 about here.]
Although the regression variables exhibit a modest correlation, the correlation
matrix shown in Table 2 shows no evidence of multicollinearity.
[Table 2 about here.]
dynamics of competition
11Thus, the coefficients are multiplied by -1 so that higher values represent higher competition.
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6. Empirical model
In order to estimate the effect of leverage on firm performance, a baseline model
(Equation (3)) is formulated as
ROAi,t = α + λt + µi + β1Levi,t−1 + β2Comj,t + ψ
′
xi,t + εi,t, (3)
whereROAi,t is return on assets of firm i at time t; α is the constant term; λt is a set of
time dummies controlling for macroeconomic events; µi represents firm-specific fixed
effect; Levi,t−1 is lagged leverage of firm i at time t; Comj,t measures the degree of
competition in industry j at time t proxied alternatively by the Herfindahl-Hirschman
Index (HHI) and the Boone indicator (BI); xi,t is a set of control variables described
in section 5, including the squared term of lagged leverage (Lev2i,t−1); and εi,t is the
error term. The lagged value of leverage helps address any possible reverse causality
between leverage and performance. Also, the inclusion of the squared term of lagged
leverage takes account of the possible nonlinear effect of leverage on performance.
Likewise the effect of size is unlikely to be linear, hence warrants the inclusion of the
squared term (Size2i,t) as in Ghosh (2008)
As pointed out in the preceding sections, product market competition is an impor-
tant factor in the analysis of leverage and firm performance. In order to capture the
effect of competition, equation (3) is rewritten to include the interaction of leverage
and product market competition as shown below:
ROAi,t = α+λt+µi+β1Levi,t−1 +β2Comj,t+β3Levi,t−1×Comj,t+ψ′xi,t+εi,t, (4)
where Levi,t−1×Comj,t is an interaction term: the product of lagged leverage of firm
i in industry j at time t and competition in industry j at time t. All other terms
are as previously defined. Again, particular attention is paid to the possibility of
non-monotonic effect of leverage on performance.
Differentiating equation (4) with respect to leverage and competition, alterna-
tively, gives the following:
∂ (ROAi,t)
∂ (Levi,t−1)
= β1 + β3Comj,t (5)
which is modified in all specifications involving the squared term of leverage; and
∂ (ROAi,t)
∂ (Comj,t)
= β2 + β3Levi,t−1. (6)
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From equation (5), when HHI is used as a measure of competition the effect
of leverage on performance of firms in an unconcentrated (perfectly competitive)
industry is captured by β1 whilst β1 + β3HHIj,t shows the effect of leverage at
specified levels of concentration or competition. When BI is used as the measure
of competition, however, the interpretation is reversed: β1 captures the effect of
leverage for firms in an uncompetitive industry whilst β1 + β3BIj,t captures the
effect of leverage at specified levels of competition. Using equation (5), it is possible
to probe the marginal effect of leverage at specified values of HHI or BI. Using
the variance-covariance matrix, the standard errors corresponding to the marginal
effects of leverage can be obtained (see Aiken & West, 1991).12 Equation (6) also
shows that the marginal effect of competition on firm performance is given by β2 +
ψLevi,t−1. Here β2 captures the effects of competition for non-leveraged firms whilst
β2 + ψLevi,t−1 captures the same effect for leveraged firms.
Also, in order to verify that the leverage effect is driven by rivalry predation,
variants of equations (3) and (4) are estimated by replacing leverage with relative-
to-industry mean leverage or simply relative leverage. For marginal effect analysis,
equations (5) and (6) are modified accordingly.
All equations are estimated using panel fixed effect models. The Hausman (1978)
specification test is performed in order to assess the suitability of the fixed effect
models against random effect models. The Hausman (1978) test is motivated by the
fact that the fixed effect and the random effect should not be different for the case
where µi is uncorrelated with the regressors.
Finally, the study uses cluster-robust standard error estimations to control for
possible heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation within firms.
6.1. Endogeneity issues
Although lagged values of (relative) leverage are used in the above models to mit-
igate simultaneity bias, to fully address the simultaneity issues and omitted variable
bias in respect of leverage, and also measurement errors in respect of the proxies
for competition, equations (3) and (4) are re-estimated using the 2-step Generalised
Method of Moments (GMM) technique. As instruments for leverage, the paper em-
12For instance, the standard errors corresponding to these marginal effects for the model
with only leverage and competition interaction term are given by SE(β1 + β3Com) =√
V (β1) + 2ComV (β3) + Com2Cov(β1, β3) where V (β1) and V (β3) are respectively the variances
of β1 and β3; Cov(β1, β3) is the covariance between β1 and β3; and Com is the specified value of
HHI or BI. For models involving the squared term of leverage the formula is modified. See Aiken
& West (1991).
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ploys tangible assets as in Campello (2006), and non-debt tax shield (up to two lags).
13 The competition variables are instrumented with up to two lags of their own.
The use of tangible assets and non-debt tax shield as instruments is intuitively
appealing and diagnostically satisfactory. First, tangibility of assets is a major de-
terminant of firms’ access to finance (Booth et al., 2001; Campello, 2006), and its
effect on performance is only through financing, making it a valid instrument for the
leverage-performance equation (Campello, 2006). Second, firms with a larger non-
debt tax shield are expected to have lower leverage (DeAngelo & Masulis, 1980),14
and non-debt tax shield is not expected to have a direct effect on firms’ operating
profits before depreciation and amortisation. This suggests that non-debt tax shield
is a valid instrument for leverage. In fact, Fama & French (2002) provide empirical
support for the inverse relationship between non-debt tax shields and the level of
firms’ leverage.
7. Results
7.1. Leverage-performance relationship
Table 3 presents the estimation results of equations (3) and (4). Models 1 to
4 are alternative specifications in which the HHI is used as the inverse measure of
competition. Models 5 to 8, on the other hand, are the models using BI as the main
measure of competition. Models 1, 2, 5 and 6 show the baseline results obtained
from the estimation of equation (3).
The results show that financial leverage has positive effects on firm performance.
These results suggest that financial leverage mitigates the agency costs of outside
equity as noted in Jensen & Meckling (1976), particularly given the conservative use
of debt among South African firms. With relatively higher use of equity finance,
it is expected that the agency costs of equity will outweigh the agency costs of
debt, making the agency benefits of debt much more realisable for South African
listed firms. At this point, this finding is broadly consistent with the empirical
evidence in Weill (2008) and Berger & Bonaccorsi di Patti (2006). Controlling for
the squared term of leverage (models 2 and 6) does not change the results. The
coefficients of the leverage squared terms are significantly negative, implying that
13Lagged values of leverage are not used as instruments due to likely persistence in leverage.
Persistence in financial leverage is documented in Lemmon et al. (2008), noting that Compustat
nonfinancial firms’ financial leverage exhibits very little variation over time, as its determinants are
stable over long periods of time.
14Non-debt tax shields are inversely related to expected taxable profits and, therefore, the ex-
pected payoff from interest tax shields.
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excessive levels of leverage may have an adverse effect on firm performance. However,
given the magnitude of these coefficients, the overall effect of leverage on performance
is positive.15 These findings provide support for Hypothesis 1.
[Table 3 about here.]
The results show no statistically significant effect of competition on firm perfor-
mance. The results also show that most of the control variables are significantly
related to performance. Consistent with Ghosh (2008), firm size is nonlinearly and
significantly related to profitability. Thus, whilst the benefit of size (including diver-
sification and economies of scale) may help boost firm performance, excessive expan-
sion may make moral hazard pervasive (see Himmelberg et al., 1999). Also, growth
is found to be insignificantly related to profitability. Expected return (MROA) has
a significant positive effect on profitability.
The estimation results for equation (4) are shown in models 3, 4, 7 and 8. These
estimations differ from the previous regressions by the inclusion of interaction terms
between leverage and competition. The effect of leverage on the performance of firms
is, again, positive and increases (decreases) with product market competition (con-
centration). Although the leverage-competition interaction terms and the squared
terms of leverage are not significant when jointly included in the same model, a joint
test of significance (White F test) confirms they are jointly significant.16 Hence,
models 3 and 7 are re-specified without the squared terms of leverage as shown in
models 4 and 8; the coefficients of the interaction terms are significant. Interestingly,
concentration (competition) is significant only when interacted with leverage, sug-
gesting the presence of predatory product market interactions which vary directly
with financial leverage. The interaction term between leverage and the HHI (model
4) is negative whilst the one between leverage and the BI (model 8) is positive. These
findings suggest that the benefits of leverage increase (decrease) with product market
competition (concentration), lending support for Hypothesis 2.
These findings broadly provide support for a number of theoretical predictions
(Bolton & Scharfstein, 1990; Chevalier & Scharfstein, 1996) and evidence that suggest
that increase in financial leverage is associated with predatory behaviour in concen-
trated (uncompetitive) product markets (Chevalier, 1995a,b; Opler & Titman, 1994;
Kovenock & Phillips, 1997).17
15Marginal effects are discussed in detail in section 7.3
16The non-significance of the interaction term and squared term of lagged leverage may be due to
high correlation between them. Correlation between these two variables ranges between 0.74 and
0.80.
17Opler & Titman (1994) and Kovenock & Phillips (1997), however, find a direct negative effect
18
7.2. Relative leverage-performance relationship
In what follows, the paper seeks to substantiate the possibility that the marginal
effect of leverage is, at least to some extent, competitor-driven. Employing relative
leverage, which measures the difference between a firm’s leverage and the mean
industry leverage, may corroborate the existence of predatory behaviour as outlined
in Chevalier & Scharfstein (1996) and Bolton & Scharfstein (1990). Additionally, this
approach helps to check the robustness of the preceding results. Hence, equations
(3) and (4) are revised such that leverage is replaced with relative leverage. The
results are shown in Table 4.
[Table 4 about here.]
Consistent with the previous findings, the coefficient of relative leverage is positive
and significant; the interaction term involving the HHI is negative and significant;
whilst the one involving the BI is positive but statistically insignificant.18 Thus,
the results show that firms that are more leveraged than their rivals have higher
performance which increases (decreases) with product market competition (concen-
tration), lending support for Hypothesis 3. The results are robust when taking
possible non-monotonicity into account, and to alternative proxies for competition.
Also, competition (the BI) is found to exert a statistically significant positive effect
on firm performance. These results, coupled with the preceding findings, suggest
that the disciplining effects of competition as argued by Hart (1983) and Aghion
et al. (1997) outweigh the crowding-out effect of competition as indicated also in
Aghion et al. (1997). Thus, competition has a net disciplining effect which reinforces
the disciplining effect of leverage and results in higher performance.
7.3. Marginal effect analysis
The natural progression at this stage is to probe the interaction terms between
leverage and competition in order to analyse the moderating impact of competition
on the leverage-performance relationship. The models are evaluated at the mean, low
(one standard deviation below the mean) and high (one standard deviation above
the mean) values of the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) and the Boone indicator
of leverage on firm performance. Also, as discussed earlier, their performance measures are different
from the one used in this paper.
18Although the coefficient of the interaction term between lagged leverage and BI is statistically
insignificant, it is jointly significant with the coefficient on lagged leverage.
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(BI).19 Where the squared terms of (relative) leverage are involved, the marginal
effects are evaluated at the mean of (relative) leverage.20 Table 5 summarizes the
marginal effect analysis. The first two columns show the marginal effects involving
HHI whilst the last two show those involving the Boone indicator.
In Panel 1, attention is restricted to the models involving only the squared terms
of leverage. This corresponds to models 2 and 6 in Tables 3 and 4. It shows that
the marginal effects of leverage and relative leverage are positive and statistically
significant. Similarly, in Panel 2, where the interaction and the squared terms of
leverage and relative leverage are involved, the marginal effects on performance of
leverage and relative leverage are positive over the relevant levels (mean, low and
high) of HHI and the Boone indicator (BI). Surprisingly, the marginal effects of
relative leverage with respect to HHI are significant only at high values of HHI. This
might be due to the concern raised earlier about this specification. Panel 3 relates
to models in which the squared terms of leverage and relative leverage are dropped.
The results, again, indicate that the marginal effects of leverage and relative leverage
are positive over the relevant levels of HHI and the BI, and vary directly (inversely)
with product market competition (concentration).
The above findings suggest that, even though the performance effects of leverage
and relative leverage depend, to a large extent, positively (negatively) on product
market competition (concentration), which is consistent with the presence of signifi-
cant predatory market behaviour, the overall effect is significantly positive.
[Table 5 about here.]
7.4. GMM results
The 2-step Generalised Method of Moments estimation results for equation (4) are
presented in Table 6. Leverage is instrumented with tangible assets as in Campello
(2006), and non-debt tax shield (up to two lags). Competition proxies are instru-
mented with up to two lags of themselves, with appropriate modification of the in-
teraction terms. Appropriate test are conducted to verify the validity and relevance
of the instrument.
[Table 6 about here.]
19The mean and standard deviation of Boone indicator are respectively 0.43 and 0.66. For the
HHI, they are respectively 0.15 and 0.13.
20The mean of leverage and relative leverage are respectively 0.23 and 0.00.
20
The results are similar to those presented in previous sections. As before, financial
leverage is shown to have a significant positive effect on firm performance and this
effect increases (decreases) with product market competition (concentration). These
findings are robust to alternative measures of leverage and competition. For instance,
using HHI as the inverse measure of competition (models 1 and 2), the coefficients
of leverage and relative leverage are positive and significant whilst the interaction
effects are significantly negative. This is consistent with models 3 and 4 where
leverage, relative leverage and their interactions with the Boone indicator are all
significantly positive.
The marginal effects of leverage and relative leverage are probed, again, at mean,
low and high levels of product market competition (concentration). For brevity of
this paper, the results are not shown here. First, the marginal effect of leverage on
firm performance is positive over the relevant range of HHI. Using relative leverage
instead of absolute leverage yields similar results. The results remain qualitatively
unchanged when the Boone indicator is used as the proxy for competition.
7.4.1. Model diagnostics
To assess the extent to which the instruments satisfy the orthogonality condi-
tion, Hansen J-statistic is computed. The Hansen J-statistic follows a χ2 distribu-
tion where the number of overidentifying restrictions gives the degrees of freedom.
The null hypothesis is that the overidentifying restrictions are valid. Where the or-
thogonality condition is not satisfied, either because the instruments are not truly
exogenous or the instruments are wrongly excluded from the model (see Baum et al.,
2003), the null hypothesis is rejected. The p-values of the Hansen J-statistics are well
above 0.1, meaning that we cannot reject the null hypothesis that the instruments
are valid.
Although the instruments are valid, they could be weakly correlated with the en-
dogenous regressors. Hence, a weak identification test is also performed by computing
the Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald F statistic and comparing it with the Stock-Yogo IV
critical values. The null hypothesis is that the instruments are weakly identified. As
a rule of thumb, a Kleibergen-Paap Wald rk F statistic greater than 10 is required to
reject the null hypothesis (Baum, 2006). As shown in Table 6, the Kleibergen-Paap
Wald rk F statistics are all greater than 10. Hence, we can reject the null hypothesis
and conclude that the instruments are not weakly correlated with the endogenous
regressors.
7.5. Other robustness test
The study tests for the robustness of the results in various ways. Besides using
different measures of leverage, and different proxies for competition, in unreported
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regressions, different measures of performance (return on equity and after-tax return
on assets) were also used with qualitatively similar results. In addition, the sensitivity
of the results to alternative and additional control variables, including volatility
of returns on assets and dividend, are analysed. The results are not qualitatively
different from the above. In relation to outliers, fairly robust results are observed for
models in which all variables are winsorised within 5% and 95%.21
8. Conclusion
In this paper, the effects of leverage on firm performance are investigated. The
study further investigates the extent to which the leverage-performance relationship
is influenced by product market competition. Using a panel dataset of South African
listed firms, it is found that financial leverage has a significant positive effect on firm
performance. Also, using the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index and the Boone indica-
tor as alternative measures of competition, it is found that firms in unconcentrated
(competitive) industries significantly benefit from leverage whilst those in concen-
trated (uncompetitive) industries are likely to suffer adverse effects of leverage. This
notwithstanding, the marginal effect of leverage is positive across the relevant range
of product market concentration (competition). Accounting for nonlinearity in the
leverage performance relationship does not qualitatively alter these findings. In ad-
dition, the results are robust to alternative measures of leverage, competition, and
to different estimators.
The findings of this paper have two main policy implications. First, South African
firms could significantly improve their performance if there is a shift from the current
conservative use of debt. Second, whilst policies aimed at popularising debt-finance
to firms could have significant positive effects on their performance, the benefits of
such policies would be much better realised if matched with effective pro-competition
product market regulations.
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Table 1
Mean values of variables by industry
Industry ROA Lev Size Growth MROA Tang NDTAX HHI BI
Oil and Gas 0.068 0.247 14.135 2.483 0.097 0.649 0.046 1.000 −0.272
Basic mat −2.008 0.348 13.717 9.866 −1.262 0.429 0.038 0.098 0.494
Industrial goods 0.109 0.206 12.991 23.884 0.110 0.245 0.046 0.100 0.382
Consumer goods 0.124 0.166 13.500 0.177 0.127 0.304 0.031 0.126 0.773
Health care 0.160 0.303 14.391 0.440 0.168 0.359 0.026 0.410 0.510
Consumer service 0.115 0.143 13.471 1.384 0.122 0.263 0.041 0.097 0.335
Telecommunication 0.355 1.040 14.619 0.411 0.364 0.314 0.133 0.421 −0.825
Technology 0.143 0.119 11.788 0.378 0.145 0.108 0.052 0.373 0.529
This table presents the descriptive statistics for the data. The sample comprises 257 South African firms.
ROA is total operating profit plus depreciation and amortization (EBITDA) divided by total assets. Lev is
the ratio of debt to total assets. Size is the natural logarithm of total assets. Growth is the one-year growth
rate of sales. MROA is 2-year moving average of return on assets. Tang is the ratio of property, plant and
equipment to total assets. NDTAX is non-debt tax shield, measured as depreciation and amortization divided
by total assets). HHI is the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index. BI is the Boone indicator (coefficients estimated
from equation (2) multiplied by -1 so that higher values reflect higher competition).
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Table 2
Correlation matrix
Variables ROAi,t Levi,t−1 Rlevi,t−1 Sizei,t Growthi,t MROAi,t BIi,t HHIi,t
ROAi,t 1.000
Levi,t−1 −0.044∗∗ 1.000
Rlevi,t−1 −0.052∗∗ 0.863∗∗∗ 1.000
Sizei,t 0.159∗∗∗ −0.059∗∗∗ −0.101∗∗∗ 1.000
Growthi,t 0.001 −0.004 −0.004 −0.014 1.000
MROAi,t 0.719∗∗∗ −0.340∗∗∗ −0.324∗∗∗ 0.191∗∗∗ −0.047∗∗ 1.000
BIi,t 0.127∗∗∗ −0.025 −0.072∗∗∗ −0.011 −0.000 0.095∗∗∗ 1.000
HHIi,t 0.014 0.041∗ 0.008 −0.078∗∗∗ −0.010 0.017 −0.124∗∗∗ 1.000
This table presents the unconditional correlation coefficient between any pair of variables. Lev and Rlev are
alternative measures of leverage, and therefore they do not simultaneously enter the same regression. The sample
comprises 257 South African firms over the period 1998 to 2009. The subscripts i and t indexes firm and time.
RLev is relative-to-industry mean leverage measured as the deviation of each firm’s leverage from the industry
mean leverage. All other variables are as described in table 1. ***, ** and * indicate significance at 1%, 5% and
10%, respectively
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Table 5
Marginal effect of leverage
HHI BI
Leverage Relative leverage leverage Relative leverage
Panel 1
Mean lev. 2.849∗∗∗ 0.384∗∗∗ 2.844∗∗∗ 0.389∗∗∗
(1.005) (0.117) (1.011) (0.121)
Panel 2
Mean HHI; mean BI and mean lev. 2.737∗∗ 1.649 2.902∗∗ 0.521∗∗
(1.256) (1.146) (0.240) (0.204)
Low HHI; high BI and mean lev. 2.939∗∗∗ 2.377 2.735∗∗∗ 0.682∗∗
(0.675) (1.755) (0.657) (0.325)
High HHI; low BI and mean lev. 2.536 0.921∗ 2.952∗∗ 0.359∗∗∗
(1.872) (0.538) (1.442) (0.103)
Panel 3
Mean HHI; mean BI 1.382∗∗∗ 1.036∗∗∗ 1.149∗∗∗ 0.482∗∗∗
(0.241) (0.382) (0.391) (0.165)
Low HHI; high BI 1.959∗∗∗ 1.440∗∗ 1.985∗∗ 0.614∗∗
(0.380) (0.589) (0.776) (0.267)
High HHI; low BI 0.804∗∗∗ 0.632∗∗∗ 0.311∗∗∗ 0.351∗∗∗
(0.102) (0.181) (0.037) (0.084))
This table shows the marginal effect analysis of the results presented in tables 3 and 4. Columns 1 and 2 respectively
presents the marginal effect of leverage and relative leverage in models involving HHI whilst columns 3 and 4 present
similar results for models involving BI. Panel 1 presents the results for models involving the squared terms of leverage
and relative leverage without interaction terms. Panel 2 shows results for models involving the squared terms of
leverage and relative leverage as well as the interaction terms. Panel 3 shows similar results for models involving
the interaction terms without the squared terms. Marginal effects are evaluated at mean, low and high HHI or BI
and, where relevant, at mean leverage or relative leverage. Standard errors are shown in parenthesis. ***, ** and *
indicate significance at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively.
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Table 6
Leverage-performance relationship - GMM approach
Dep. var.: ROA
Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) Boone indicator (BI)
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Levi,t−1 3.6170∗∗∗ 0.9102∗∗∗
(1.2500) (0.1953)
Rlevi,t−1 2.7851∗∗∗ 0.7775∗∗∗
(0.7880) (0.1315)
Sizei,t 1.0661∗∗ 1.2689∗∗∗ 0.7271∗ 1.7228∗∗∗
(0.5135) (0.4865) (0.3880) (0.6011)
Size2i,t −0.0329∗ −0.0470∗∗∗ −0.0277∗∗ −0.0686∗∗∗
(0.0185) (0.0181) (0.0134) (0.0224)
Growthi,t −0.0001 −0.0002 0.0001 −0.0005∗∗
(0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002)
MROAi,t 1.0933∗∗∗ 1.0203∗∗∗ 0.9869∗∗∗ 1.1432∗∗∗
(0.0565) (0.0572) (0.0364) (0.3110)
HHIj,t −0.5093 2.5468
(4.0577) (4.9214)
BIj,t −0.2670 1.3191∗∗∗
(0.4351) (0.2259)
Levi,t−1*HHIj,t −7.7576∗∗∗
(2.9041)
Rlevi,t−1*HHIj,t −6.5813∗∗∗
(1.8485)
Levi,t−1*BIj,t 2.8172∗∗∗
(0.8401)
Rlevi,t−1*BIj,t 1.6438∗∗∗
(0.3068)
N 1748 1748 1741 1492
Hansen J P-value 0.2633 0.3359 0.4398 0.2453
K-P W. F-stat 16.2652 14.9901 23.2961 2.2316
This table shows the GMM estimation results for the effects of leverage on firm performance. The sample
comprises 257 South African firms over the period 1998 to 2009. The variables and table structure are as
described in Table 3. Absolute measure of leverage is used in columns 1 and 2 whilst relative− to− industry
mean leverage is used in columns 3 and 4. Cluster and heteroskedasticity robust standard errors are shown in
parenthesis. Each model includes year dummies which are not reported. ***, ** and * indicate significance at
1%, 5% and 10%, respectively.
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